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The Effect of Foreign Affiliate Employment on Wages, 
Employment, and the Wage Share in Austria 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper estimates the effects of outward Foreign Direct Investment (employment in the 
affiliates abroad) on employment, wages, and the wage share in Austria using panel data for 
the period of 1996-2005. There is evidence of significant negative effects of FDI on both 
employment and wages, and consequently on the wage share. The results are not limited to 
workers in low skilled sectors. The negative employment effect is mainly due to the rise in the 
employment in the foreign affiliates in Eastern Europe. The negative wage effects are 
originating from affiliate employment in both the East and the developed countries in the 
industry, but FDI in the East has positive wage effects in the services sector due to possible 
scope effects.    
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to empirically analyze the impact of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) outflows on the labor market outcomes in Austria. In the last fifteen years 
there has been a significant increase in the globalization of the Austrian economy through an 
increase in exports, final imports, offshoring (intermediate imports), and outward FDI. The 
integration of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) to the European economic sphere, 
added a new dimension to the globalization of the Austrian economy, although Austrian FDI 
towards Western Europe also increased significantly during this period. The globalization of 
the economy has, however, coincided with adverse developments in the labor markets.
1
 Since 
the 1980s industrial employment is decreasing, and total employment is stagnant in spite of 
the jobs created in services. The decline in manufacturing jobs is an ongoing process of 
structural change that started in the 1980s, but the decline did not decelerate after 1990 
compared to the 1980-1990 period in spite of the improved trade position of Austria. The 
opposite trend in domestic employment compared with the increasing foreign affiliate jobs is 
rather striking as can be seen Figure 1. In the meantime real wages have stagnated in the total 
economy particularly since the mid 1990s. The service wages are even slightly declining in 
the 2000s. This development is in striking contrast to the strong improvement in labor 
productivity, which has always exceeded real wage increases since the 1980s with few 
exceptions. As a combination of these developments, the wage share (labor 
compensation/gross value added in non-agricultural sector) declined from a level of 65% in 
1978 to 51% as of 2005.   
The decline in labor share is not specific to Austria, although Austria has experienced 
one of the highest rates of decline in the wage share among the OECD countries. The general 
declining trend in labor’s share in many OECD countries since the late-1970s and early 1980s 
has been analyzed by several previous studies (Harrison, 2002; Diwan, 2001; Epstein, 2000, 
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Guscina, 2006; Stockhammer et al, 2007), and  is recently also discussed by the OECD 
(2007), IMF (2007), and the European Commission (2007). Both the deterioration in the wage 
share and industrial employment is a phenomenon that dates back to late 1970s, which is 
partly related to structural change and technological improvement. However the strong 
increase in the foreign affiliate employment in the same period brings forward the question 
whether the acceleration in the decline in the wage share and stagnation in employment since 
the mid-1990s is also related to increased multinational activity.         
.  Austria is an interesting case to investigate the effects of FDI on labor market 
outcomes, being a small economy, which is highly integrated to the other high wage as well 
as low wage countries. It is also a puzzling case, since the deterioration in labor market 
performance and income distribution continued in spite of the significant profitability gains 
due to Eastern enlargement in the past years (Altzinger, 2006).  
In this paper first we estimate the effects of FDI on employment and wages for a panel 
of sectors for the period of 1996-2005, and then combining these effects we calculate the 
cumulative effects on functional income distribution, i.e. the wage share. In the estimations 
we control for technological change. The effects are separately estimated for low and high 
skilled sectors and the industry vs. services as well. We pay particular attention to the possible 
different effects of FDI in the developed countries vs. the CEECs, i.e. low wage countries.  
The contribution of this paper is to analyze the home country effects of FDI on both 
wages and employment, and finally to combine these effects to address the effect on 
functional income distribution using detailed sectoral analysis. The existing literature on the 
home country effects of FDI for other countries estimates mostly the effects on employment 
(e.g. Blomström et al. 1997; Brainard and Riker 1997; Hatzius, 1998; Hanson et al, 2003; 
Konings and Murphy, 2006; Becker et al, 2005; European Commission, 2005, Cuyvers et al; 
2005; Molnar et al 2007) and in a few cases also the effects on wages (e.g. Desai et al 2005). 
The issue of distribution is however only addressed with regards to within labor distribution, 
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i.e., the share of skilled workers in the wage bill (e.g. Slaughter, 2000; Head and Ries, 2002). 
The IMF (2007) and the European Commission (2007) estimate only the effects of 
outsourcing or trade on the labor share, but not of FDI. The methodological novelty of our 
paper is to estimate the effects on labor share as an outcome of labor demand as well as wage 
bargaining rather than in reduced form. In the case of Austria the existing studies analyze only 
the effects on employment; none of them estimates the effects on wages or labor share (Bellak 
and Altzinger, 2001; Marin, 2004; Pfaffermayr, 2001; Falk and Wolfmayr, 2007a, b). Our 
paper has also important differences in comparison to these papers with respect to the 
methodology of estimation of the employment effects, which will be discussed in more detail 
in Section five.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the empirical model 
and the theoretical expectations about the effects of FDI on labor market outcomes. Section 
three discusses the data and methodological issues. Section four reviews the empirical 
literature. Section five presents the estimation results. Section six concludes. 
2. The empirical model 
This section presents the labor demand and wage bargaining equations, which then are 
solved simultaneously to calculate the effect of FDI on labor’s share.  
The industry’s demand for labor is given as follows: 
)ln()ln()ln()ln()ln( fwfKqw wKqwl        (1) 
where ln(l), ln(w), ln(q), and ln(K) are  employment, wage (labor compensation, 
deflated by sectoral producers price index), real value added, and real capital stock of the 
parent firm respectively; ln(wf) is the wage in the foreign affiliates of the multinational firm. 
All variables are in logarithms.   measures other possible determinants of labor demand. A 
similar function is estimated by Hanson et al (2003) to estimate the effects of multinational 
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activity on domestic employment. The constant-output own-wage elasticity of domestic labor 
demand, 
w , is assumed to be negative.  
Regarding the direction of the foreign wage effect, the question is whether foreign 
labor is a substitute or complementary to domestic labor. In a capital abundant country, it 
could be expected that increased multinational activity may lead to some increase in the use 
of capital and less demand for labor. In a skilled labor abundant country the demand for 
skilled labor’s employment is also expected to increase relative to unskilled labor as 
headquarter services increase (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). But skilled labor might also be 
substituted by foreign labor through an overall increase of capital intensity at home. So 
initially employment at the parent company may fall due to substitution effects, but then there 
may be additional production of skill-intensive products to be exported to the foreign 
affiliates or elsewhere (scope effects), and a general increase in market share and output due 
to cost saving effects (scale effects), which may increase also overall employment (Hanson et 
al., 2003). Thus the net effect depends on the negative substitution vs. positive scope and 
scale effects, i.e. the net of jobs destroyed and created.  Horizontal FDI, compared to vertical 
FDI, will have less effect on the composition of factor demand, but through the trade channel 
it may generate negative employment effects particularly in tradable sectors, since it replaces 
the exports of the country (Head and Ries, 2002); however horizontal FDI may also create 
more demand for skilled labor at the headquarters of the multinational firm. Similarly, vertical 
FDI may lead to more intermediate imports, which may substitute certain types of domestic 
labor, it may however also create more exports (to the foreign affiliate through intermediate 
exports and elsewhere if there is a cost advantage obtained through FDI) and more output 
through scale effects, which can partly or completely offset the labor replacement effects.  If 
the cross-wage elasticity of domestic labor demand, wf ,  is positive, then domestic and 
foreign labor are substitutes, thus lower costs for foreign labor decreases domestic labor 
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demand; if the elasticity is negative, domestic and foreign labor are complementary (Hanson 
et al, 2003), thus scale and scope effects dominate.  
If there are positive scale effects, these will be already captured by output. To decrease 
this bias, we use value added instead of output as a control variable in Equation (1); but 
nevertheless part of the scale effect will still be captured by the value added. 
Capital is treated as quasi-fixed as it is common in the current literature (Morrison, 
1986; Berman et al, 1994; Slaughter, 2000; Head and Ries, 2000; Hanson et al 2003; Becker 
et al, 2005; Cuyvers et al, 2005; OECD 2007). This is also preferable from an empirical point 
of view, since it is hard to measure the capital costs.
2
    
In the following we modify the empirical model due to data constraints: we do not 
have data about the wages in the affiliates of the multinationals; however we have data about 
the employment in the affiliates weighted by the share of the parent firm. The only data 
available on foreign wages is sectoral average wages in the host countries based on different 
data sources. However, the FDI literature reports significantly higher wages and productivity 
in foreign owned firms than in the domestically owned firms (Lipsey, 2004). Therefore 
average sectoral wages could be a misleading proxy; thus we prefer to use the affiliate 
employment as a proxy for the wages in the affiliates. Desai et al (2005), Molnar et al (2007), 
and Falk and Wolfmayr (2007a, b) also estimate domestic employment as a function of the 
foreign affiliate employment. Head and Ries (2002) estimate the share of the non-production 
workers in the wage bill as a function of the foreign affiliate employment/home employment.  
Our transformation follows the following logic: the foreign affiliate employment, ln(f), is a 
function of wages at the home country, ln(w), and at the affiliate, ln(wf), as well as the value 
added, ln(qf), and capital, ln(Kf) at the affiliate:  
)ln()ln()ln()ln()ln( wKqwf wfKfqfwf       (2) 
Solving for ln(wf) in equation (2), and substituting in equation (1)  
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
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(3) 
The problem of the lack of data for 
fq and fK can be solved by incorporating time 
effects in the equation to be estimated. Now the coefficient of ln(w) in the labor demand 
equation for the parent firm is modified. The sign of )(
wf
wwf
w


   is ambiguous, if both 
cross-wage elasticities, 
wf and w , are positive or negative, and own-wage elasticities, w  
and wf , are both negative. Regarding the coefficient of the foreign affiliate employment, 
accepting the common assumption that wf <0, if cross-wage elasticity of domestic labor 
demand, wf , is positive, then 
wf
wf


<0, thus domestic and foreign labor are substitutes with 
respect to both wages and employment of foreign employees. If wf <0, then 
wf
wf


>0, thus 
domestic and foreign labor are complementary with respect to wages as well as employment. 
However as opposed to the common assumption, if wf >0, then the effect of foreign wage vs. 
foreign employment on domestic employment will be opposite.  
Another data problem is that we have only data at sectoral level, not at firm level. 
Therefore in this paper we are estimating sector-specific labor demand. Thus the foreign 
affiliate employment will have not only a direct effect on employment in the parent 
companies but also an indirect effect due to the possible spillovers to the other domestic 
firms. Lipsey (2004) points out that there may be a difference between firm and industry level 
studies, since substitution among types of activities may take place not only between home 
and foreign operations of a firm, but also between parent firms and non-multinational firms in 
the same industry at home. It is possible to have a case where the parent company enjoys 
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positive scope and scale effects, but the employment in the sector overall is negatively 
affected through substitution of domestic supplier networks with the foreign affiliate supply.     
Renaming the coefficients in equation (3), the sector’s demand for labor is given as 
follows: 
ittiftikicttiktiqitwtiti fictkqwl ,,,,,, )ln()ln()ln()ln()ln()ln(     (4) 
where i and t are the sector and time indices respectively. Capital stock is further 
disaggregated as information and communication technology (ICT) and non-ICT capital 
stock, ln(ki) and ln(icti) respectively (both real values), in order to differentiate the technology 
effects from extensive investment. Non-ICT capital may be substituting or complementing 
labor; the latter would be the case if the firm has excess capacity. A negative substitution 
effect of ICT capital may be expected at least for less skilled workers (Chennels and Van 
Reenen, 1999). βt is the time dummy, capturing time specific shocks such as exogenous 
technology shocks not captured by the ICT capital stock, or policy changes and other 
institutional factors such as employment taxes or employment legislation that may affect labor 
demand. i  is a sector specific coefficient. The issue of endogeneity of wages will be handled 
by the use of proper instrumental variables at the estimation stage, as will be discussed in 
more detail in Section three. 
The wage bargaining model is given as follows: 
ittiftikicttiktiltiti fictklw ,,,,,, )ln()ln()ln()ln()ln(    (5) 
where all variables are as defined above. This model is consistent with union 
bargaining and efficiency wage models (Konings and Vandenbussche, 1995; Greenaway et al, 
2000). In order to avoid the complications of modeling the formation of price expectations, an 
ex post bargained wage model is used. We thus look at the outcome of bargaining, i.e. the (ex 
post) real wage. Furthermore to be parallel to the labor demand equation, we are estimating 
real wages deflated by producers’ prices rather than consumer prices3. The employment in the 
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foreign affiliates captures the effects of relocation on the bargaining power of domestic labor, 
and shifts the bargaining curve. Since employment in the foreign affiliates is also a function 
of domestic wages, proper instruments will be used at the estimation stage in order to avoid 
endogeneity.
4
 For a given capital/labor ratio the effect, 
f , is positive, if foreign labor is 
complementary, and negative if it is a competitor. Particularly efficiency seeking FDI may 
generate negative effects through the so called threat effects as pointed out in the political 
economy literature (Onaran, 2009; Harrison, 2002; Diwan, 2001; Burke and Epstein, 2001; 
Rodrik, 1997; Crotty et al, 1998).  The increase in international capital mobility and the 
consequent asymmetry between the fall back options of capital vs. labor may lead to a 
downward pressure on bargaining power of labor and thereby wage demands. This may 
particularly be the case if the destination of FDI is low wage countries. However even among 
high wage countries capital mobility may generate certain labor disciplining effects. 
Furthermore the threat effect may take place even in the absence of relocation, thus it may not 
be directly reflected in the actual volumes of capital flows (Burke and Epstein, 2001).  
The capital/labor ratio, thus ln(k)+ln(ict)-ln(l), determines the productivity of labor 
and thereby worker’s aspirations, and is expected to have a positive effect on wages, but the 
degree at which workers can index wages to productivity improvements will depend on their 
bargaining power. Also in more capital intensive sectors with a higher capital/output ratio the 
organizational strength and the bargaining power of the workers is expected to be higher, and 
firms would be more willing to accommodate wage demands, since labor costs are 
constituting a smaller part of their total costs. In the case of ICT-capital, however, the positive 
effect may be reversed with a technological replacement effect, particularly for the less skilled 
workers.   
The employment in the sector captures the insider power and the demand effect, and 
will affect workers bargaining power positively and lead to a higher real wage. However the 
responsiveness of wages to employment will also depend on the strategy of the labor unions, 
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i.e. the trade-off between wages and employment for the unions during a recession. Unions 
may choose to bargain for job protection and accept stagnant wages, in which case the 
positive effect of employment on wages will disappear. Moreover in our model employment 
and capital stock are used both in logarithms. Thus the negative denominator effect of 
employment in the capital/labor ratio will also be incorporated to the coefficient of 
employment (in logarithm) in our model, making the interpretation of the sign of the 
coefficient hard. We nevertheless prefer this equation because it is parallel to the employment 
equation, which will have a computational advantage when deriving the wage share below. 
Capital stocks and employment are also treated as endogenous.  
αi is a sector specific coefficient. αt is the time dummy, accounting for the economy 
wide labor market conditions that affect workers’ outside options5, an alternative economy 
wide wage
6
, the institutional factors that may affect the bargaining power like union density, 
collective bargaining coverage
7
, structural change in the composition of the workers, the 
effects of major changes in industrial relations after privatization
8
, and the threat effects due 
to potential capital mobility not captured by actual volumes.   
Finally the wage share (labor compensation share in value added) in logarithms, 
ln(ws), is by definition 
ln(ws)=ln(w)+ln(l)-ln(q)        (6) 
Solving equations (4), (5), and (6) simultaneously we get:  
)ln(
1
))1()1((
)ln(
,,,
, q
x
ws
lw
itittilxwxllwwttii
ti 





 
(7) 
where x is the vector of ln(q), ln(k), ln(ict), and ln(f). We take the derivative of ln(ws) 
with respect to the components of x, e.g. the foreign affiliate employment, ln(f), for a given 
value added
9
: 
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lw
lfwf
f
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
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


1
)1()1(
ln
)ln(
       (8) 
This expression incorporates the effect of the foreign affiliate employment on wages 
discounted by the effect of domestic wages on employment (if wages have a negative effect 
on employment) and the effect of the foreign affiliate employment on domestic employment 
amplified by the effect of domestic employment on domestic wages, both discounted by a 
common factor ( lw1 )
10
. If neither domestic wages nor employment affect each other ( w
= l =0), then the effect of the foreign affiliate employment on the wage share is simply the 
summation of its effects on domestic wages and employment.  
3. Data and estimation methodology    
The empirical analysis is based on the panel data of the sub-sectors of the industry and 
services. Appendix B reports the data sources. Employment in the foreign affiliates of Austria 
in each sector is further disaggregated as affiliates in developed countries with relatively 
higher wages vs. the East
11
. FDI to other countries is not incorporated as a third category 
since their share in total outward FDI is negligible. The sectors are defined according to the 
sector of the foreign affiliate.
12
 The detailed data for employment in the foreign affiliates is 
available only at the level of 1-digit NACE classification and for the period of 1993-2004. 
Capital stock is also only available at 1-digit level.   
In all equations lags of the explanatory variables and the dependent variable will be 
used to account for short vs. long run effects
13
. The lagged employment accounts for the 
adjustment process due to costs of hiring and firing. The lagged wage accounts for sticky 
wage adjustment through time. Furthermore, the capital stock and the foreign affiliate data 
ends in 2004; in order to be able to estimate the effects including 2005, we will use the first 
and second lags of these variables. By doing so we do not lose observations overall. Using 
deeper lags makes also economically sense, since the effect of both capital accumulation and 
FDI on labor markets may require a longer adjustment process. 
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Thus the equations (4) and (5) to be estimated for employment and wages take the 
following form respectively: 
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(5a) 
The sector index i=1,…,12 for the industry14  i=13,…,20 for services, i=1,…,20 for the 
total economy
15
, and t=1996-2005.
16
 c is the affiliate country index corresponding to affiliates 
in developed countries vs. the East. We also estimate the effects for a pool of economy wide 
high and low skilled sectors including both manufacturing and service sectors in order to 
account for different impacts in sectors hiring pre-dominantly skilled vs. less skilled labor. 
Appendix C reports the skill taxonomy.   
We estimate the dynamic equation in first difference form in order to transfer out the 
fixed effects, and use a generalized method of moments (GMM) technique as in Arellano and 
Bond (1991) to overcome the bias that will result in the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable due to differencing. The importance of the partial adjustment process are the reasons 
for estimating a dynamic specification in difference form rather than a fixed effects models, 
which would have the advantage of accounting for heterogeneity across sectors. Nevertheless 
the disadvantage of the dynamic estimation is the low number of cross-sections. We compute 
standard errors that are robust to the existence of sector specific serial correlation. 
Additionally, the real wage is endogenous and therefore instrumented in the employment 
equation. In the wage equation employment, capital stock, and foreign employment are all 
endogenous and instrumented. GMM technique of Arellano and Bond (1991) is particularly 
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useful in dealing with cases of endogeneity, when no good instruments are available outside 
the immediate data set (Roodman, 2006). In the employment equation the instruments are 
employment dated t-2 and earlier, the second and third lags of real wage
17
, and the first 
differences of the exogenous variables, i.e. output, capital stock, foreign employment and 
their lags. In the wage equation the instruments are wages dated t-2 and earlier, the second 
and third lags of employment, the third and fourth lags of the capital stock, and foreign 
employment.   
Based on these estimation results we calculate the long run coefficients using the 
contemporaneous and lagged effects and the speed of adjustment. The wage share effects in 
equation 8 are then calculated using these long run coefficients. 
4. Empirical Literature 
In the empirical literature regarding the home country effects of FDI, there are rather 
mixed results (Molnar, et al, 2007; Lipsey, 2004). Blomström et al. (1997) analyze the 
relation between employment in the parent firm and foreign production based on firm level 
data for the US and Sweden, and find some negative relationship in the US particularly due to 
activities in developing countries, but a robust positive relation in Sweden, suggesting 
differences in investment strategy. Contrarily Hatzius (1998) finds evidence for substitution in 
Sweden based on a positive effect of affiliate wages on parent employment. Braconier and 
Ekholm (2000) differentiates between the locations of the affiliates, and find evidence of a 
substitutionary relationship between Swedish parent and affiliate employment in other high 
income locations, but no effect due to affiliates in low-income locations. Sectoral differences 
are also important: Lipsey (2004) reports positive relation in the machinery sector in the US, 
but negative relation in the transport equipment sector.  Lipsey et al (2000) find for Japan a 
positive effect of foreign output on domestic employment in the vast majority of the 
industries. For the case of the US, Brainard and Riker (1997) also find that there is 
substitution between labor at home and abroad, however the substitution is greater between 
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affiliates in different countries. Hanson et al (2003) find that the US manufacturing labor has 
a complementary relation with high skilled foreign labor, and a substitution relation with low-
skilled labor.  Desai et al (2005) find a complementary relation between the parent and 
foreign affiliates based on binary estimations for both wages and employment in the US 
manufacturing industry. Using outward FDI as the explanatory variable, Molnar et al (2007) 
find that multinational activity has a significant positive effect on employment growth in the 
US, but a negative effect in Japan, and no effect in Germany. In the case of multinationals in 
the EU, Konings and Murphy (2006) find substitution effect between parent employment and 
its affiliates in the EU15, but no effect with respect to the low wage regions in the EU and the 
CEECs. However Cuyvers et al (2005) find a negative effect of the foreign affiliate 
production in the CEEC on parent labor demand in the EU firms; Falk and Wolfmayr (2008) 
also find that the parent and foreign affiliate employment are substitutes in the EU firms, but 
the elasticity of substitution is lower in the case of the affiliates in the CEECs. For France and 
Belgium European Commission (2005) finds evidence of substitution based on the positive 
effects of the affiliate labor costs in the CEECs on employment, and for Germany and Sweden 
Becker et al (2005) also find substitution effects on parent employment due the positive 
effects of higher affiliate wages in both Western and Eastern Europe.     
Regarding the effects of FDI on employment in Austria, Bellak and Altzinger (2001) 
find a negative effect of affiliate sales on parent employment using firm level data for 1995. 
However Marin (2004), again using firm level data for 1999-2001, finds no statistically 
significant effect of affiliate sales on parent company’s employment, and even a 
complementary  effect of the wages of the affiliates in the CEECs on parents’ employment 
(negative coefficient), but no effect of wages of the affiliates in the South Eastern European or 
former Soviet Union countries. Falk and Wolfmayr (2007a) find no significant impact on 
industrial employment, but a negative effect on services due to affiliate employment in both 
developed countries and the five New Member States based on sectoral dynamic panel data 
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estimations for 1994-2004. Based on firm level data, they find no significant effect of affiliate 
employment on parent employment (Falk and Wolfmayr, 2007b). Pfaffermayr (2001) 
estimates relative employment at home vs. the foreign affiliates as a function of relative 
wages based on sectoral panel data for the manufacturing industry for 1990-96, and finds that 
employment at home industry relative to the employment in the foreign affiliates in developed 
countries have a positive cross-wage elasticity indicating substitution between home and 
foreign employees, whereas the opposite is true in the case of the affiliates in the four Eastern 
European neighbor countries. 
5. Estimation results 
5.1 Employment 
Table 1 reports the estimation results for employment modeled as in equation (4a) for 
the industry, the total economy, low and high skilled sectors, and services. We will base our 
discussion of the regression results on the long-run effects, rather than separately discussing 
the current or lagged effects.  
Please insert Table 1 approximately here 
The Sargan test (from the homoskedastic estimator, which is reported at the end of the 
result tables) can not reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. 
There is no second order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals, which is an 
important condition for the validity of the estimations. The lagged dependent variable is 
significant in all specifications, verifying the need for a dynamic model. 
In the industry an increase in the foreign affiliate employment in the East has a 
significant negative long run effect on employment in the same sector in Austria. The same 
effect takes place in the total economy and in both the low and high skilled sectors. The 
effects are economically significant as well. Table 2a shows the cumulative effect of each 
explanatory variable on employment, calculated as the long run coefficients multiplied by the 
actual change in the explanatory variable. A memo item in the last line reports the actual 
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change in employment. These results indicate that in the industry the 190% increase in 
affiliate employment in the East over the period of 1995-2004 has resulted in a decline of 
6.96% in employment. Thus for a given positive effect of growth and a negative effect of 
technical change, employment would have declined 6.96% less in the industry, if there were 
no Austrian foreign investment in the East in this period. This means a loss of 43402 jobs in 
the industry in Austria during 1996-2005. Similarly the cumulative number of jobs that were 
lost in the total economy are estimated to be 155488 over 10 years (a decline of 5.97%) 
corresponding to an increase of 241% in employment in the affiliates in the East in all sectors. 
To put it differently each job that has been created additionally over this period in the Eastern 
affiliates of Austria has substituted 0.53 jobs in net terms in the industry, and 0.58 jobs in the 
total economy (as a ratio to jobs created in the Eastern affiliates). These numbers show the net 
of the jobs lost due to substitution and the jobs created due to scope and scale effects.  
Please insert Table 2 approximately here 
Regarding the employment in the foreign affiliates of Austria in developed countries 
while no effect can be detected in the industry, there seems to be a significant negative effect 
in services. However these results need to be interpreted with care, since estimations cover 
only few sectors (thereby few observations), and while the direction of the effects is 
indicative, the magnitudes can be misleading.  
The workers working in the higher skilled sectors are more affected than those 
working in the lower skilled sectors; however employment declines in both sector groups due 
to outward FDI.  
Regarding the other explanatory variables, while value added as well as non-ICT 
capital have positive effects, the ICT capital has a negative effect on industrial employment, 
reflecting the effects of labor saving technical change. The effect is economically highly 
significant in spite of the existence of time dummies.  In the total economy the effect ICT 
capital as well as non-ICT capital is insignificant, whereas growth remains to be significant. 
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The technical change in this case is only captured by the time dummies. Employment does not 
seem to be responsive to changes in wages, however as discussed in section two, under 
plausible conditions, this coefficient could be negative. Braconier and Ekholm (2000) and 
Hatzius (1998) also do not find a significant own-wage elasticity of home employment for 
Sweden.   
Time dummies remain significant despite the presence of capital stock as an 
explanatory variable. This captures not only the ongoing structural change but also other 
exogenous technical change effects that are not reflected by the capital stock.  
These results, which indicate substitution effects of the low-wage foreign affiliate 
labor on employment in Austria, are consistent with the direction of the results in Hanson et al 
(2003) for the US, Hatzius (1998) for Sweden; Becker et al (2005) for Germany and Sweden; 
European Commission (2005) for France, and Belgium, and Cuyvers et al (2005) and Falk 
and Wolfmayr (2008) for the EU. It is harder to compare the magnitude of the effects, since 
all these studies estimate cross-wage elasticities. 
Comparing with the other studies on Austria, the negative effects of Eastern affiliate 
employment are consistent with the findings in Bellak and Altzinger (2001), but not those in 
Marin (2004). However both studies are not directly comparable with ours, since they use 
firm level data and concentrate on the effects on the parent company and do not discuss the 
indirect effects at the sector level. Furthermore their periods of analysis cover earlier phases 
of Austrian FDI (1995 and 1999-2001), and the country coverage is also more limited than 
ours. 
Pfaffermayr (2001)’s results indicate substitution of domestic manufacturing 
employment by developed host country employees, but when Austrian wages decline relative 
to affiliate wages in the Eastern host countries, relative employment at home decreases, which 
indicates complementarity. These results are different from ours. There are several differences 
that can contribute to these differences: most importantly his estimation period covers a very 
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early stage, 1990-96, when Austrian firms were having the initial market expansion phase 
despite rising relative wages, since foreign wages were still rather low and the firms had the 
motivation of market expansion. Contrarily we cover the later phase of 1996-2005. 
Pfaffermayr is covering only four Eastern European host countries. Furthermore he estimates 
relative employment as a function of relative wages, and indeed if we interpret the story 
behind the outcome, Pfaffermayr’s results might be consistent with our results: after the initial 
transition shock there has been wage increases in the East both in absolute and relative terms; 
nevertheless employment in the Eastern foreign affiliates went on increasing (Pfaffermayr, 
2001). This implies a positive own-wage elasticity of labor demand in the foreign affiliates. In 
the meantime manufacturing employment in Austria declined, implying a negative cross-
wage elasticity of home labor demand, which supports the complimentarity thesis from the 
perspective of foreign wage elasticity. Given our discussion in section two, however, this 
implies a negative effect of the foreign affiliate employment on domestic employment, thus a 
substitution relation between the two quantities of labor. The two outcomes are consistent in 
this special case of the parallel movement of foreign wages and employment in the affiliates. 
The most recent and comparable study on Austrian employment is by Falk and 
Wolfmayr (2007a) which uses the same data set as this paper, and finds a negative effect of 
affiliate employment in services (in the dynamic specification), which is consistent with our 
study; however there are differences with respect to the destination of FDI: we find no effect 
of Eastern affiliate employment in services, whereas they do. More importantly, in the 
industry they find no significant effects contrary to us. There are a number of methodological 
differences in detail, which could explain these different findings: One difference is that they 
cover only the Eastern employment in the five NMS, leaving out roughly one third of the 
foreign affiliate employees in Eastern Europe during the 2000s. The more important 
difference is the use of lags: while they do not use lagged effects, we find that this makes a 
difference in the results. They use the Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond system estimator, we 
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repeated our estimations using also this estimator using the lags of the foreign employment 
variables instead of just the current value, and we again find a negative effect of affiliate 
employment in the East.
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 However, when current values are used instead of the lagged 
values, the effects of foreign employment are not significant. Since it takes a while for 
domestic production and employment to adjust to the changes in the international division of 
labor and the possibility of new production locations abroad, lagged effects are important, and 
should not be disregarded.  
Further evidence based on firm level data is supplied by Falk and Wolfmayr (2007b),   
according to which they find no significant effect of affiliate employment on parent 
companies’ employment. However they report only static OLS estimations in differences; 
thus both dynamic estimations and lagged effects could significantly change these results. 
Furthermore even if there are no significant negative effects on the parent companies, the 
indirect spillovers might well be negative. Our sectoral estimations incorporate also such 
indirect effects, and negative effects seem to be dominating according to our results.  
5.2 Real wages 
Table 3 reports the estimation results for real wages modeled as in equation (5a).
19
  
According to the long-run coefficients, employment in the foreign affiliates in the East as well 
as developed countries have a significant negative effect on wages in the industry, but no 
effect in the total economy. This is due to the positive effects in the services: there is evidence 
of some positive effect of affiliate employment in the East on wages in the services as well as 
in the low skilled sectors. This could be explained by a positive scope effect and skill 
upgrading in the low skilled or services sectors, which have a complementary relation to 
Eastern affiliate employment. In the total economy the increase in affiliate employment in 
developed countries has a negative effect in only low skilled sectors, whereas there is a 
negative wage effect of Eastern affiliate employment in high skilled sectors.    
Please insert Table 3 approximately here 
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Table 2b shows the cumulative effect of each explanatory variable on wages, 
calculated as the long run coefficients multiplied by the actual change in the explanatory 
variable. In terms of economic significance, the increase in the affiliate employment in the 
East and developed countries resulted in a 17.9% and 7.2% cumulative decline in real wages 
in the industry during the period of 1996-2005 respectively. Thus altogether real wages would 
have increased 25.2% more in the industry, if there were no Austrian foreign investment in 
this period.   
Regarding the other explanatory variables, while employment has a negative effect on 
wages in the industry, non-ICT capital stock has a positive effect, reflecting an increase in 
wages together with the capital intensity of the sector.  Again the time dummies remain 
significant and are mostly negative, indicating the significance of institutional factors as well 
as possible negative threat effects of potential capital mobility that is not reflected by the 
volume of actual transactions.  
5.3 Wage share 
Combining the long run effects on employment and wages as defined in equation (8), 
we get the joint effect of the changes in capital stock (ICT and non-ICT) and the employment 
in the foreign affiliates of Austria. Based on the calculated long run coefficients for the wage 
share, Table 2c reports the cumulative %-points effect
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 of the actual change in the 
explanatory variables.  These effects are partial effects for a given level of value added.  
According to the estimation results, in the industry the increase in employment in the 
foreign affiliates of Austria in the East and the developed countries has resulted in a 
cumulative decline of 13.2%-points and 4.7%-points in the wage share respectively during 
1996-2005 (thus a total of -17.9%-points). These results overestimate the 8.2%-points actual 
decline in the wage share, however the direction is suggestive. In the total economy the 
effects are economically not very significant due to the lack of negative wage effects: the 
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increase in the Eastern affiliate employment has resulted in only a minor 1.8%-point decline 
in the wage share.  
6. Conclusion   
This paper estimates the effects of outward FDI on employment, wages, and the wage 
share in Austria. There is evidence of significant negative effects of FDI on both employment 
and wages. The negative employment effect of Austria’s investment abroad is primarily due 
to the rise in the employment in the foreign affiliates in the East.   The employment in the 
foreign affiliates in developed countries seems to have a negative effect in services only.  The 
negative wage effects are originating from affiliate employment in both the East and the 
developed countries in the industry, but no effect is found in the total economy. There is 
evidence of some positive effect of affiliate employment in the East on wages in the services 
due to possible scope and skill-upgrading effects.  Bringing together these effects we find that 
the increase in employment in the foreign affiliates of Austria has resulted in a deterioration 
of wage share with the effect originating from both country groups in the industry, and only 
from the East in the total economy. The results are not limited to workers in low skilled 
sectors; there are also negative effects in high skilled sectors.   
Technological change also results in a significant decline in the industry wage share; 
however the negative effects of FDI remain significant after controlling for technological 
change, and are larger than that of the technological change.  Time dummies are significant 
and mostly negative. In the employment estimation this captures not only the ongoing 
structural change but also other exogenous technical change effects that are not captured by 
the capital stock. In the wage equation time effects show the importance of institutional 
factors that are changing at the expense of labor’s bargaining power and the possibility of 
threat effects of potential capital mobility beyond the actual FDI flows. 
It could be said that these results nevertheless reflect a relatively short period of 
10years, and thus only incorporate the substitution effects, and the stages of scope and scale 
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effects have not arrived yet. However labor market outcomes have persistence. Negative 
employment effects generate long term unemployment problems as well as a decline in 
labor’s bargaining power. Additionally job losses lead to a negative popular perception of 
European Integration, leading to political tensions. Therefore the negative effects of FDI on 
labor market outcomes should be important concerns for national as well as EU-wide 
economic policy. The source of the problem is not FDI itself, but the large wage differentials 
within the EU, and the lack of any EU level public policy of social cohesion and regional 
development to accompany European EnlargementAttracting private FDI via low wages and 
taxes is perceived to be the only solution for growth in the New Member States. Thereby the 
multinationals have the chance to push labor at different production locations to compete with 
each other. However, the negative effects of openness are not an unavoidable destiny. On the 
contrary in the European context, labor in the Old and New Member States have more 
common ground than they currently exploit. There is scope for international cooperation, in 
case the coordination failure can be overcome.  The process of European Integration could be 
seen as an advantage to redefine the rules of the game via coordinating the institutional setting 
of wage bargaining, incorporating productivity-led wage increases, and designing a European 
framework for the convergence of minimum wages, working hours and conditions. This also 
defines new tasks for the trade unions in the Old Member States in terms of communicating 
with the trade unions in the East, particularly if they are organized in different affiliates of the 
same multinational company.  But most of all the issues of wage coordination and imposition 
of such minimum conditions require the consensus and effort of the labor in the New Member 
States. Understandably labor in the East can only be convinced to stop seeing lower wages as 
their only advantage to attract private FDI from the West, if there is a systematic EU public 
policy on regional convergence and social cohesion, which in turn requires an economically 
relevant EU budget.   
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Figure 1: Domestic and Foreign Affiliate Employment, Industry 
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Table 1. Estimation results: Δln Employment (1996-2005)
Variable Industry Total Economy Total low skilled Total high  skilled Services
Δln Employment t-1 0.698 0.762 0.730 0.730 0.725
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Δln Real wage t -0.082 -0.076 -0.120 -0.051 -0.387
0.517 0.457 0.439 0.568 0.040
Δln Real wage t-1 -0.055 -0.056 0.300 -0.193 -0.087
0.717 0.597 0.105 0.152 0.585
Δln Real value added t 0.383 0.289 0.455 0.215 0.161
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.145
Δln Real value added t-1 -0.200 -0.177 -0.356 -0.073 0.088
0.009 0.000 0.003 0.101 0.146
Δln Non-ICT capital t-1 -0.251 -0.104 0.346 -0.415 -0.178
0.225 0.614 0.320 0.001 0.696
Δln Non-ICT capital t-2 0.324 0.238 -0.072 0.554 0.244
0.076 0.237 0.810 0.000 0.590
Δln ICT capital t-1 0.140 0.049 0.097 0.079 0.053
0.011 0.351 0.296 0.057 0.128
Δln ICT capital t-2 -0.150 -0.049 -0.115 -0.078 -0.063
0.009 0.343 0.208 0.053 0.098
Δln foreign Employment developed t-1 0.001 0.000 0.013 -0.010 -0.001
0.880 0.976 0.048 0.101 0.756
Δln foreign Employment developed t-2 -0.011 -0.007 -0.023 0.007 -0.017
0.356 0.192 0.008 0.255 0.002
 Δln foreign Employment eastern t-1 0.020 0.011 0.039 0.008 0.001
0.005 0.111 0.000 0.191 0.865
 Δln foreign Employment eastern t-2 -0.031 -0.017 -0.041 -0.014 0.007
0.000 0.010 0.000 0.070 0.130
Constant 0.413 0.456 -3.006 1.212 2.123
0.629 0.678 0.035 0.296 0.369
Number of observations 105 170 73 97 65
Number of groups 12 20 9 11 8
AR (2) p-value 0.947 0.486 0.101 0.232 0.112
Joint sign. of time dummies (p-value) 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan test (p-value) 0.654 0.595 0.706 0.320 0.187
 
Notes: p-values under coefficients (in italics). Dynamic panel estimations (GMM) including 
time effects. Standard errors are robust to the existence of sector specific serial correlation. 
The real wage is treated as endogenous and instrumented. See Appendix B for data sources 
and Appendix C for sectoral classification. 
 0 
Table 2. Cumulative % change effects (1996-2005)
a. Employment: Cumulative % change during 1996-2005 due to: 
Industry Total economy
Real wage 0.00 0.00
Real value added 18.90 11.59
Non-ICT Capital 0.69 0.00
ICT Capital -20.97 0.00
Foreign affliate employment-developed countries 0.00 0.00
Foreign affliate employment-east -6.96 -5.97
Foreign employment total cumulative %change effect -6.96 -5.97
Memo item: Actual cumulative % change in employment -4.89 7.32
b. Wage: Cumulative % change during 1996-2005 due to: 
Industry Total economy
Employment 3.35 -3.31
Non-ICT Capital 0.93 0.00
ICT Capital 0.00 0.00
Foreign affliate employment-developed countries -7.23 0.00
Foreign affliate employment-east -17.93 0.00
Foreign employment total cumulative %change effect -25.17 0.00
Memo item: Actual cumulative % change in wages 12.86 3.91
c. Wage share: Cumulative %-point change during 1996-2005 due to:
Industry Total economy
Non-ICT Capital t-1 0.75 0.00
ICT Capital t -4.32 0.00
Foreign affliate employment-developed countries -4.74 0.00
Foreign affliate employment-east -13.18 -1.82
Foreign employment total cumulative %change effect -17.92 -1.82
Memo item: Actual cumulative %-point change in wage 
share -8.24 -4.80  
Note: The cumulative effect of each explanatory variable on employment is calculated as the long run coefficients calculated based on the 
estimation results in Table 1 for employment and Table 3 for wages multiplied by the actual change in the explanatory variable. The effect on the 
wage share is calculated by combining the effects on employment and wages as in Equation (8). 
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Table 3. Estimation results: Δln Real wage (1996-2005)
Variable Industry Total Economy Total low skilled Total high  skilled Services
Δln Real wage t-1 0.819 0.739 0.673 0.788 0.560
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Δln Employment -0.045 -0.015 -0.038 -0.018 -0.157
0.415 0.790 0.589 0.755 0.034
Δln Employment t-1 -0.124 -0.118 -0.110 -0.069 0.057
0.042 0.041 0.120 0.251 0.562
Δln Non-ICT capital t-1 0.263 0.137 -0.621 0.217 0.323
0.038 0.292 0.219 0.012 0.331
Δln Non-ICT capital t-2 -0.019 -0.022 0.642 -0.128 -0.369
0.879 0.873 0.118 0.265 0.296
Δln ICT capital t-1 -0.036 0.044 -0.094 0.039 0.104
0.409 0.185 0.431 0.228 0.000
Δln ICT capital t-2 0.052 -0.038 0.102 -0.031 -0.094
0.224 0.276 0.390 0.356 0.000
Δln foreign Employment developed t-1 -0.015 -0.002 -0.015 0.006 -0.002
0.001 0.744 0.003 0.367 0.696
Δln foreign Employment developed t-2 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005
0.980 0.817 0.578 0.609 0.470
 Δln foreign Employment eastern t-1 0.002 -0.002 0.017 -0.007 -0.003
0.779 0.512 0.035 0.086 0.431
 Δln foreign Employment eastern t-2 -0.017 0.002 -0.016 0.006 0.016
0.004 0.639 0.005 0.267 0.000
Constant 1.612 3.073 4.860 2.226 6.019
0.131 0.002 0.000 0.035 0.000
Number of observations 105 170 73 97 65
Number of groups 12 20 9 11 8
AR (2) p-value 0.197 0.125 0.376 0.227 0.740
Joint sign. of time dummies (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan test (p-value) 0.219 0.048 0.289 0.394 0.521
Notes: p-values under coefficients (in italics). Dynamic panel estimations (GMM) including time effects. Standard errors are 
robust to the existence of sector specific serial correlation. Employment, capital stock, and foreign employment are all treated as 
endogenous and instrumented. See Appendix B for data sources, and Appendix C for sectoral classification. . 
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Sources: Own calculations based on OENB data for foreign employment, and Statistics 
Austria for the others. See Appendix B for details. 
Notes: The data for the foreign affiliate employment starts from 1993-2004. See Appendix C 
for the skill taxonomy.  Eastern countries cover 20 countries including the 10 Eastern 
European new member states, five non-member South Eastern European countries, and four 
European countries of the Community of Independent States (Russia, Ukraine, White Russia, 
Moldavia).
Appendix A: Annual % change in labor market outcomes (compund average)
Wage share Real value added Employment Real Wage Foreign Employment developed* Foreign Employment eastern*
TOTAL ECONOMY
1976-1980 -0.03 2.80 1.45 2.09
1980-1985 -0.62 1.26 -0.31 0.33
1985-1990 -0.20 3.22 1.37 2.08
1990-1995 -0.21 2.29 0.78 1.11 -0.12 29.46
1995-2000 -0.54 3.19 1.05 0.28 10.78 13.19
2000-2005 -0.49 1.74 0.33 -0.19 4.78 13.13
1990-2005 -0.47 2.40 0.72 0.40 9.34 18.15
 TOTAL INDUSTRY
1976-1980 0.51 2.93 0.49 2.49
1980-1985 -1.11 0.78 -2.57 0.73
1985-1990 -0.02 2.86 -0.50 2.68
1990-1995 -0.11 0.93 -2.03 1.74 -3.28 30.27
1995-2000 -1.57 4.31 -0.93 1.08 6.47 12.40
2000-2005 -0.09 1.62 -0.62 0.58 3.58 13.09
1990-2005 -0.66 2.28 -1.19 1.13 8.06 15.89
 TOTAL HIGH INDUSTRY
1976-1980 0.74 6.70 1.80 2.86
1980-1985 -0.74 1.23 -2.00 1.10
1985-1990 -0.35 4.92 0.87 2.80
1990-1995 -0.34 2.29 -1.70 1.94 -5.44 24.25
1995-2000 -1.76 5.17 -0.02 1.15 6.69 10.24
2000-2005 0.28 2.35 0.14 0.39 1.88 18.60
1990-2005 -0.68 3.26 -0.53 1.16 7.49 18.47
 TOTAL LOW INDUSTRY
1976-1980 0.31 0.21 -0.48 2.07
1980-1985 -1.43 0.39 -3.01 0.33
1985-1990 0.21 0.88 -1.69 2.33
1990-1995 0.13 -0.61 -2.35 1.45 0.82 37.26
1995-2000 -1.32 3.20 -1.83 0.78 6.17 14.92
2000-2005 -0.58 0.59 -1.45 0.64 6.68 4.87
1990-2005 -0.67 1.05 -1.88 0.96 9.06 12.03
TOTAL SERVICE
1976-1980 -0.19 2.75 1.98 1.89
1980-1985 -0.36 1.42 0.81 0.19
1985-1990 -0.20 3.34 2.17 1.89
1990-1995 -0.15 2.71 1.81 0.99 4.05 28.38
1995-2000 -0.23 2.85 1.66 0.11 16.20 14.14
2000-2005 -0.60 1.77 0.59 -0.39 6.08 13.17
1990-2005 -0.37 2.44 1.35 0.23 10.85 20.68
TOTAL HIGH SERVICE
1976-1980 -0.51 3.40 2.48 1.74
1980-1985 -0.73 2.36 2.19 -0.07
1985-1990 -0.44 3.26 2.37 1.65
1990-1995 -0.53 2.83 1.79 0.86 9.18 31.54
1995-2000 0.03 2.85 2.52 -0.34 1.81 26.39
2000-2005 -0.64 2.03 0.94 -0.43 -2.22 15.77
1990-2005 -0.42 2.57 1.75 0.03 4.79 31.15
TOTAL LOW SERVICES
1976-1980 0.09 1.88 1.52 1.91
1980-1985 0.05 0.04 -0.55 0.07
1985-1990 0.14 3.46 1.96 2.15
1990-1995 0.48 2.53 1.84 1.18 1.99 27.07
1995-2000 -0.68 2.84 0.68 0.50 20.81 7.65
2000-2005 -0.51 1.36 0.18 -0.43 8.19 8.63
1990-2005 -0.27 2.24 0.90 0.42 12.64 11.73
 0 
Appendix B 
 
Data sources  
 
Statistics Austria, Panel data of industries, 1976 onwards, NACE 2-digit  
 
FDI-database of Austrian National Bank, 1993 onwards, NACE 1-digit (At 2 digit level even 
total FDI data is hidden or does not exist in many sectors (15, 23, 25, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36)  for 
all years or most years). 
 
EU KLEMS Database, March 2007, http://www.euklems.net for the capital stock, 1976-2004, 
NACE 1-digit 
 
Appendix C: Skill taxonomy  
Industry 
Skill groups 1-Digit 
Low Skill 
 
10-14: Mining and quarrying 
15-16: Food products, beverages and tobacco 
17-19: Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 
26: Other non-metallic mineral products 
27-28: Basic metals and fabricated metal products 
36-37: Manufacturing n.e.c. 
High Skill 20: Wood and products of wood and cork 
21-22: Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 
23-25: Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products 
29: Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 
30-33: Electrical and optical equipment 
34-35: Transport equipment 
 
Services 
Skill groups 1-Digit 
Low Skill 
 
45: Construction 
50-52: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods 
55: Hotels and restaurants 
High Skill 40-41: Electricity, gas and water supply 
60-64: Transport, storage and communications 
65-67: Financial intermediation 
70-74: Real estate, renting and business activities 
85-93: Health and social work, Other community, social 
and personal service activities 
 
Note: Classification is based on Peneder (1999). The medium skilled/blue collar industries are 
classified as medium skilled, whereas medium skilled/white collar industries sectors that are 
also technology driven are classified as high skilled; the other medium skilled/white industries 
are classified as medium skilled.  
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Appendix D Estimation results: ln Employment vs. Foreign affiliate employment, 
Methodology:  Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond system estimator (1996-2005)
Variable Industry Total Economy
ln Employment t-1 0.908 0.847  
0.000 0.000  
ln Real wage t -0.057 -0.138  
0.217 0.086  
ln Real value added t 0.142 0.217  
0.013 0.007  
ln Non-ICT capital t-1 -0.014 -0.043  
0.177 0.056  
ln ICT capital t-1 -0.007 -0.007  
0.162 0.320  
ln foreign Employment developed t-1 -0.003 -0.008  
0.522 0.198  
ln foreign Employment eastern t-1 -0.005 -0.003  
0.026 0.462  
Number of observations 132 215  
Number of groups 12 20  
Sargan test (p-value) 0.156 0.287  
Hansen test (p-value) 1 0.979  
AR (2) p-value 0.710 0.310
 
 
 p-values below the coefficients (in italics) 
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Endnotes 
                                               
1
 Appendix A shows the average annual change (compound average) of wages, employment, 
the wage share, value added, productivity as well as the foreign affiliate employment for the 
sub-periods during 1976-2005.  
2
 Hatzius (1998), who also estimates a labor demand equation similar to Hanson et al (2003), 
does not make the assumption of quasi-fixed capital, but has capital costs in the theoretical 
model, and drops them at the stage of estimation due to data problems. Greenaway et al. 
(1999) and Hine and Wright (1998) rely on time dummies to reflect capital costs, but this is 
based on the assumption of perfect capital markets. 
3
 Although the workers bargain for a targeted purchasing power based on expected CPI 
inflation, for the firms their producers’ prices (determined by the wage costs and non-labor 
costs and their mark-up power) are the binding constraints regarding the wage demands of the 
workers. So one could estimate the real wage equation either deflated by consumer or 
producers’ prices and account for these price differentials by adding the wedge, the ratio of 
CPI/PPI. But since it is not a core variable, we will drop it at the estimation stage to gain 
degrees of freedom.   
4
 An alternative would be to estimate a system of three equations for domestic employment, 
foreign affiliate employment, and domestic wages. However, the focus of this study is on 
home country effects, and using proper instrumental variables handles the issue of 
endogeneity sufficiently. Furthermore the data limitations mentioned above do not make it 
possible to estimate parallel equations for affiliate wages. 
5
 Economy wide unemployment to account for general labor market conditions is not added, 
since this also requires dropping the time dummies; also in a panel context economy wide 
variables are less useful. 
6
 In Austria wage determination is a result of industry-wide collective bargaining, but pattern 
bargaining makes it highly centralized. But Aiginger et al. (1996) also mention that 
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subsequent negotiations at the firm level are possible, particularly in large firms, which are 
exposed to higher international competition. Nevertheless regarding the effects of an 
alternative wage as well as pattern bargaining,
 
 a reference wage like the average wage rate of 
the economy could be included. While this would make sense, if one were only interested in 
wage differentials, it is defeating in our context, since the average wage needs to be explained 
and not taken as given. Furthermore it would require dropping the time dummies.   
7
 There is no collective bargaining coverage or union density data compatible with NACE 
classification.  
8
 See Azmat et al (2007) which cites privatization as a major factor behind the decline in the 
wage bill in the OECD in the network industries. 
9
 A constant PPI/value added deflator is assumed. 
10
 ( lw1 ) needs to be positive to have a meaningful solution. 
11
 20 countries including the 10 Eastern European new member states, five non-member 
South Eastern European countries, and four European countries of the Community of 
Independent States (Russia, Ukraine, White Russia, Moldavia).   
12
 This is also useful to measure the substitution effects in the same domestic sector. 
Analyzing the effects of FDI in one foreign sector on another domestic sector, e.g. the case of 
foreign sales affiliates of manufacturing firms, could also supply useful information, but the 
data does not include such detailed information. 
13
 Further lags are not used due to the limited sample size. They were also not significant. 
14
 The industry includes 11 manufacturing sectors and mining and quarrying. The results are 
qualitatively robust to the exclusion of mining. 
15
 The total economy excludes agriculture, since labor market dynamics in agriculture has a 
rather different character. 
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16
 Estimating these two equations in systems form would potentially create efficiency gain, 
but they are not needed for consistency. Given our limited degrees of freedom and the 
complication of systems estimation with panel data, we restrict the estimation to separate 
equations with endogeneity.  
17
 The instrument set in the case of the lags of employment is expanded as the panel 
progresses and the number of potential lags increases. This method is efficient; however it 
was not possible in the case of the other endogenous variable due to the limited matrix size of 
the estimation software (STATA 10).  
18
 The estimation results using lagged values are in the Appendix D. The results of our 
alternative specification indicate even a larger economic significance of the employment in 
Eastern affiliates: a cumulative decline of 10.4%, which correspond to a loss of 64760 jobs, 
i.e. 0.79 jobs per job created in the East.   
19
 The Sargan test except for the total economy cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid. There is no second order autocorrelation in the first 
differenced residuals. 
20
 Based on the long run elasticities for the wage share, we calculate the % change effect and 
finally express these effects in %-points, which makes more sense in the case of wage share. 
